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INTRODUCTION

It has been fifteen years since Canada decided to change the
long-standing common law rule against the enforcement of foreign
non-monetary judgments (“NMJs”).1 In Pro Swing v. Elta Golf Inc.
* SJD (Georgetown), LLM, JD (Columbia), Associate Professor, The Chinese University
of Hong Kong
** LLM candidate, University of Cambridge
1. See Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 (Can.).
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(“Pro Swing”), the Canadian Supreme Court announced that the
time was ripe to start enforcing foreign NMJs given our everglobalized world.2 At that time, this was seen as a breakthrough not
only in Canada, but also in common law jurisdictions. 3 After all
these years, although the world has certainly become more
globalized, only one additional common law jurisdiction, Jersey,
has joined Canada in formally adopting this more progressive
approach.4 It is fair to ask the question: Is the time really ripe for
foreign NMJs to be enforced in replacement of the traditional
common law rule? Or even more pessimistically, will the time ever
be ripe? On the other hand, there are some recent positive
developments. In particular, the new HCCH 2019 Judgments
Convention promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (“the Hague Judgments Convention”) prescribes
the enforcement of NMJs by including NMJs in the general
definition of “judgments.” 5 This means that signatories of the
Hague Judgments Convention will enforce not only the monetary
judgments but also the NMJs of other signatories.6
This Article makes three contributions. First, the authors
surveyed the judicial approaches of three major common law
jurisdictions, Canada, the United States and England, regarding the
enforcement of foreign NMJs. The Article covers not only the extent
to which these NMJs are enforced, but also the bases and
challenges of such enforcement. Second, the authors examine why
the enforcement of NMJs has yet to receive a wider acceptance
among the common law jurisdictions. And third, based on this
analysis, the authors then suggest a roadmap as to how NMJs can
be enforced like monetary judgments in the future.
Part II of the Article discusses the judicial development in
Canada on the enforcement of NMJs. It begins with analyzing Pro
Swing, arguably the most important decision in common law
2. Id. para. 64, 87.
3. See CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (Paul Torremans
et al. eds., 15th ed. 2017); TREVOR C. HARTLEY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 443 (2009).
4 . See Brunei Investment Agency & Bandone Sdn. Bhd. v. Fidelis Nominees Ltd.
(2008) JRC 152 (Jersey).
5. See Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, art. 3
(July 2, 2019) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
6. See id. art. 1.
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jurisdictions on the enforcement of NMJs. An examination of
subsequent cases then reveals how lower courts interpret and
apply the test set out in Pro Swing. Part III contrasts the
progressive movement in Canada with England which adopts the
traditional and prohibitive rule against the enforcement of NMJs
(“the traditional rule”). Part IV looks at the broad and inconsistent
practices of the United States, which highlight the ever-confusing
status of the enforcement of NMJs. Having compared the
approaches of the three common law jurisdictions, the Article
concludes in Part V that the enforcement of NMJs shows no more
practical problems than the enforcement of monetary judgments,
and suggests that the issue of non-enforcement lies in finding
motivation for common law jurisdictions to change the status quo.
Part VI suggests that the motivation will likely come in the form of
the major economic powers, for example, the United States, United
Kingdom and the European Union, joining the Hague Judgments
Convention, even though the enforcement of NMJs may not be the
biggest reason of countries joining the Convention in the first place.
II. CANADA – PROGRESSIVE APPROACH
A. Pro Swing: Rulings and Comments
Pro Swing, a United States manufacturer and seller of golf
clubs, and also an owner of the “Trident” trademark in the United
States, filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Ohio
against Elta, a company based in Ontario, Canada, for the alleged
breach of the Trident trademark.7 Both parties agreed to a consent
decree, endorsed by the Ohio court, in which Elta undertook not to
infringe the Trident trademark and to deliver any infringing items
to Pro Swing.8 The Ohio court later discovered Elta’s violation of
the terms of the consent decree and issued a contempt order
against Elta.9
Pro Swing later filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice a
motion for the recognition and enforcement of the Ohio court
consent decree and contempt order (“the orders”).10 The Ontario
7. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. para. 3.
10. Id. para. 5.
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Superior Court judge noted that the orders overlap to a certain
extent and contain seven elements. Of the seven elements listed,
only (4) and (5) concern monetary remedies, while the other five
concern non-monetary reliefs. The elements listed by the court are
as follows:
1) an injunction prohibiting Elta Golf from purchasing,
marketing, selling, or using gold clubs or components bearing
Pro Swing’s trademark or any confusingly similar variations of
it (contained in consent decree and contempt order);
2) an order that Elta golf surrender and deliver all infringing
clubs and/or components in its possession, along with any
advertising, packaging, promotional, or other materials, to
counsel for Pro Swing (contained in consent decree and
contempt order);
3) an order for an accounting of all infringing golf clubs and/or
components sold since the consent decree (contained in
contempt order only);
4) an order for compensatory damages based on profits
derived through sales of infringing goods since the consent
decree (contained in contempt order only);
5) an order for costs and attorney’s fees against Elta
(contained in contempt order only);
6) an order that Elta provide the names of and contact
information for the suppliers and purchasers of infringing
goods and to pay the costs of a corrective mailing (contained
in contempt order only); and
7) an order that Elta recall all counterfeit and infringing goods
(contained in contempt order only).11

Elta objected to the motion for recognition and enforcement
with two defenses.12 First, the non-monetary reliefs contained in
the orders issued by the Ohio court in United States should not be
enforceable in Canada due to the traditional rule against the
enforcement of NMJs. 13 Second, the contempt order should be

11. Id. para. 4.
12. Id. para. 5.
13. Id.
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excluded from recognition and enforcement because it was quasicriminal in nature.14
Prior to Pro Swing, Canadian courts followed the traditional
rule.15 At first instance, the Superior Court judge acknowledged the
applicability of the long-standing traditional rule, which states that
only monetary judgments for a definite sum of money are
enforceable. 16 However, she argued that the latest Canadian
jurisprudence relaxed the traditional rule and declared the orders
valid and enforceable in Ontario.17
The Court of Appeal of Ontario held that the “time is ripe for a
re-examination of the rules governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign non-monetary judgments.”18 However, the
Court of Appeal found that the orders were not sufficiently certain
in the terms, especially those on the scope of extraterritorial
application of the orders. 19 When interpreting the orders, the
Court of Appeal was not sure whether the orders intended to
restrain Elta globally, or just within the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court.20 Further, instead of seeking enforcement of
the Ohio consent order, the Court of Appeal noted that Pro Swing
could take action in Ontario based on the violation of the
settlement agreement, or on the infringement of its trademarks,
where the rights extend to Canada on the doctrine of res judicata.21
Pro Swing appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.22

14. Id. The second defence that Elta put forward relates to the characterisation of a
contempt order and attracts discussion that is not specific to non-monetary judgments.
Hence, this Article does not intend to investigate the second defence in full details.
15. Id. paras. 9-10; JANET WALKER & JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS,
14.6 (6th ed. 2005).
16. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 6.
17. Id.; Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1098 (Can.).
18. See Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2004] O.J. No. 2801 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (QL),
[2004] 71 O.R. 3d, 566, para. 9 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
19. Id. para. 11.
20. Id.
21. Id. para. 12. Doctrine of res judicata refers to the common law doctrine stipulating
that once a dispute is litigated and decided by a court of justice, the consequent decision is
considered final and the underlying dispute cannot be relitigated again. In other words,
the Court of Appeal suggested that Pro Swing could initiate fresh proceedings in Ontario
to invite the Canadian court only to determine the issue of damages as appropriate while
accepting the judgment by the Ohio District Court as res judicata on the issue of liability.
Id.
22. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52.
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The Canadian Supreme Court unanimously held that the
traditional rule should be re-examined and foreign NMJs could be
enforced in principle. 23 However, the dissenting judgment
disagreed with the detailed formulation of the test as well as its
application to the NMJ in this particular case.24 First, writing for the
majority, Judge Deschamps stated in the beginning of the judgment
that:
Modern-day commercial transactions require prompt
reactions and effective remedies. The advent of the internet
has heightened the need for appropriate tools. On the one
hand, frontiers remain relevant to national identity and
jurisdiction, but on the other hand, the globalisation of
commerce and mobility of both people and assets make them
less so. The law and the justice system are servants of society,
not the reverse. The case for adapting the common law rule
that prevents the enforcement of foreign non-monetary
judgments is compelling. But such changes must be made
cautiously.25

This paragraph set the tone for the rest of the majority
judgment. The court clearly highlighted the driving forces on the
two ends of the spectrum: sovereignty and comity. This is the everpresent balance a court has to make in private international law.26
In this context, the Canadian Supreme Court went with the comity
which is in turn based on the facilitation of international
commercial transactions over sovereignty.
Given this pro-enforcement attitude, Judge Deschamps went
on to lay down the following test based on comity:
[T]he judgment must have been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction and must be final, and it must be of a
nature that the principle of comity requires the domestic court
to enforce. Comity does not require receiving courts to extend
greater judicial assistance to foreign litigants than it does to its
own litigants, and the discretion that underlies equitable

23. Id. paras. 64, 87.
24. Id. paras.117, 120-21.
25. Id. para. 1.
26. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L REV. 360, 392 (1918)
("According to the Dutch writers such recognition and enforcement rested… upon comity
and would be declined when the interests of the forum or of its subjects would be impaired
thereby.”).
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orders can be exercised by Canadian courts when deciding
whether or not to enforce one.27

The test can be broken down into three basic requirements.
The first and second requirements are competent jurisdiction and
finality, as expressed in the quote above.28 The third requirement,
stated later in the majority judgment, is that it is not a penal
order.29 If these basic requirements are satisfied, it would still need
to be subject to the test of comity and the inherent discretion of the
courts in granting equitable orders.30
Compared with the traditional test for enforcing foreign
monetary judgments, both tests require competent jurisdiction of
the rendering court, finality, and non-penal nature of the foreign
judgment. 31 However, the newly formulated test has two
additional limbs. First, the new test requires that Canadian litigants
in local proceedings are treated equally as litigants in foreign
proceedings. Apart from ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of
private litigants, this can also be seen as a condition imposed to
balance Canadian national interests against opening the door too
wide for comity. Second, the Supreme Court made sure to leave a
backdoor by providing for a discretion for Canadian courts to
reject the enforcement of NMJs. Fine-tuning this broad discretion,
Judge Deschamps further provided some key factors for Canadian
courts to consider when assessing the exercise of the discretion,
namely, clarity and specificity of the foreign NMJs, scope of the
NMJs, judicial economy of Canada, foreseeability of the obligations
contained in the NMJs, and interests of third parties. 32 Judge
Deschamps emphasized that this was a non-exhaustive list and
served no more than an illustrative purpose.33
Despite the unanimous agreement for the enforcement of
foreign NMJs in principle, by a four-to-three split, the Supreme
27. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 31.
28. Id.
29. Id. para. 34; Walker, supra note 15, § 8.3.
30. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 31
31. The traditional test only allows enforcement of judgments that are “(a) for a debt,
or definite sum of money (not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of
a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty); and (b) final and conclusive.” LORD
COLLINS OF MAPESBURY, DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 14R-020 (15th ed.,
Vol. 1, SWEET & MAXWELL 2012); Walker, supra note 15.
32. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 30.
33. Id. para. 27.
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Court of Canada ruled that the orders in this particular case could
not be enforced. Putting aside the discussions on whether the
contempt order was penal in nature, there were four reasons
behind the majority’s refusal of enforcement of the orders.
The first reason was that judicial economy did not swing in
favor of Pro Swing and enforcement would potentially harm the
integrity of the justice system of Canada. 34 The majority argued
that judicial economy was one of the many considerations that the
Canadian courts must consider. 35 Hence, courts must consider
alternate means to achieve the particular outcome that the party
was requesting, and determine whether the proceedings in hand
were the least burdensome on Canada’s judicial system.36 In this
case, the majority ruled that Pro Swing should have considered
letters of rogatory to seek assistance of the Canadian courts instead
of enforcement proceedings, as the latter was not the least
burdensome means in Canada.37 Further, the majority suggested
that one must consider whether the matter merits the involvement
of the Canadian court. 38 If the subject matter’s value was
insignificant, it would not warrant the spending of Canadian
judicial resources. 39 In this case, since the facts that the consent
agreement was concluded on the basis of that only three golf clubs
and two golf club heads were purchased upon investigation, and
that Elta did not participate in the proceedings due to “financial
circumstances,” the majority worried that the enforcement of the
orders would eventually only find Elta insolvent.40 In other words,
without concrete evidence suggesting that the subject matter was
higher in value than the judicial costs involved, the spending of
Canadian judicial resources would not be justified. It is difficult to
argue against the consideration of judicial economy. However, the
34. Id. para. 40.
35. Id.
36. Id. para. 46.
37. In this case, Pro Swing was trying to enforce the orders with the purpose of
allowing the Ohio court to determine the damage award because the amount would differ
depending on whether the Ohio orders would take effect in Ontario. The Supreme Court
suggested that letters of rogatory were a better means because the purpose of enforcing
the orders in Ontario was to obtain evidence, which letters or rogatory were usually used
to do. Letters of rogatory would require no Canadian court supervision and incur less
judicial costs; Id. para. 44.
38. Id. para. 46.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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argument for finding Elta to be potentially insolvent is difficult to
follow. The value of the subject matter in a set of proceedings
should attach little weight to the financial positions of the parties.
Finding Elta to have only sold five golf clubs and golf club heads did
not represent that the sale of those five products was the main
source of income for Elta. Further, the fact that Elta did not
participate in the Canadian proceedings due to “financial
circumstances” was just Elta’s one-sided statement. Other than a
statement, no more objective evidence was produced to indicate
the financial position of Elta.
The second reason concerned familiarity with foreign law.41
Judge Deschamps stated that an interpretation of a foreign order
in light of Canadian law might be different from an interpretation
under the foreign law. 42 Judge Deschamps argued that the
contempt order rendered in the United States was civil and thus
remedial under US law. 43 However, should the Ohio contempt
order be recognized in Canada, it would become a quasi-criminal
order and would expose the defendant to imprisonment, which
was not intended by the Ohio contempt order originally.44 From
this, Judge Deschamps warned that “differences in laws might
trigger different obligations.”45 Hence, the Canadian courts should
only enforce orders based on laws that the Canadian courts were
familiar with so as to prevent interpreting foreign orders
differently than intended in the original jurisdiction. 46 This
approach could also ensure that the Canadian litigants would not
be exposed to unforeseen obligations due to differences in laws
and interpretations of the foreign orders.47
The authors disagree with the reasoning of Judge Deschamps
in this respect. The fact that the Supreme Court was fully aware and
certain of the civil and remedial nature of the contempt order
showed the Supreme Court’s familiarity with laws of the United
States. 48 Such familiarity should sufficiently direct the Supreme
Court from recognizing the contempt order as a quasi-criminal
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. para. 49.
Id.
Id. para. 50.
Id.
Id. para. 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 50.
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order and to allow enforcement of the contempt order in a civil and
remedial manner. This poses the question of how familiar a court
must be with foreign laws to enforce a foreign order.
The third reason was that the intended territorial scope of the
injunctive reliefs in the orders was uncertain for lack of explicit
terms.49 To start with, the Supreme Court stated that an internet
transaction should not be able to transform a United States
trademark protection into a worldwide one. 50 In other words,
United States trademark protection should have no extraterritorial
effect in Canada in principle.51 This was regarded as the issue of
extraterritoriality.52 However, given that it was a consent decree
and a contempt order (based on the violation of the consent decree)
demanding enforcement in Canada, the question in this case
should be directed to whether Elta could, by consent, have agreed
to such an extension, which was a matter of interpretation.53Judge
Deschamps acknowledged the fact that Elta must have agreed to
the extraterritorial application of the specific order of
surrendering the infringing inventory when he agreed to
surrender the infringing golf clubs in Ontario to Pro Swing’s
counsel in Ohio.54 However, Judge Deschamps disagreed that such
consent applied to both orders in general.55 The court took issue at
the Ohio orders that it did not state expressly whether it would
apply beyond the borders of the United States to Canada.56 Much of
the language was clouded in general terms.57 The Supreme Court
saw no explicit terms in the orders indicating that only profits
generated in the United States were subject to accounting. The act
of voluntarily extending the reach of the United States trademark
protection to Canada by the Supreme Court would just “offend the
principle of territoriality.”58 Hence, the majority was of the view
49. Id. para. 62.
50. Id. para. 56.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. para. 55
55. Id. para. 56.
56. Id.
57. Id. para. 57 (such as “to make an accounting to Pro Swing of all golf clubs . . . it has
sold which bear the TRIDENT or RIDENT marks . . . since the entry of the Consent Decree . . .
[and to] include a sworn statement of account of all gross and net income derived from
sales of TRIDENT and RIDENT golf clubs or golf club components . . . “).
58. Id.
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that the orders should not be interpreted as applying outside the
borders of the United States. This argument is difficult to follow.
There was no evidence or legal argument suggesting that the
consent to the extraterritorial application of one specific order was
severable from the other orders. It must be emphasized that it was
not one order that Elta consented to, but an entire settlement
agreement. The fact that the majority found Elta’s consent to the
extraterritorial application of one order should naturally extend to
the entire agreement, unless further evidence or the terms of the
consent decree suggested the otherwise.
The fourth reason was that, as a matter of public policy,
enforcement of the orders would potentially offend the third
parties’ quasi-constitutional rights of protection of personal
information. 59 The majority stated that the quasi-constitutional
nature of the protection of personal information has been
recognized by the Canadian courts on different occasions.60 In this
case, the contempt order required Elta to provide the names of and
contact information for the suppliers and purchasers of infringing
goods. 61 The majority worried that the provision of such
information would contravene the quasi-constitutional rights of
personal information rights of the third parties.62 In other words,
without evidence suggesting that the information to be disclosed
was not covered by the quasi-constitutional rights of personal
information protection, or that the rights of the third parties were
not infringed, the public policy defense remained valid.63
Based on the above four reasons, the majority ruled that the
orders should not be granted comity as the balancing exercise did
not swing in Pro Swing’s favor. Thus, the court opened the door,
but thought this case should not pass.64
Pro Swing is the first, albeit clumsy, step in breaking off from
the traditional rule. The dissenting judgment disagreed with the
majority on every front.

59. Id. para. 60.
60. Id.; H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.) [2006] 1 S.C.R. 441 (Can.).;
Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Comm’r of Official Languages), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773 (Can.).;
Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403 (Can.).
61. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 4.
62. Id. para. 60.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 62.
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Firstly, with regard to the issues of judicial economy and
integrity of the Canadian justice system, Chief Justice McLachlin,
writing the dissenting judgment, warned that the factor of judicial
economy should not be over-emphasized. 65 She observed that
Canadian courts had taken an active approach in imposing orders
requiring supervision when necessary and had yet to impose an
undue burden on the Canadian legal system.66 Further, during the
proceedings, Elta never suggested that accounting or production
would pose difficulties. 67 Hence, Chief Justice McLachlin argued
that a court should not jump to the conclusion that an order was
not enforceable based on “the hypothetical possibility of the need
for future court supervision.”68 In other words, one should look at
the facts to determine whether there was a real prospect of
requiring court supervision that would outweigh the benefits of
enforcement.
Secondly, Chief Justice McLachlin agreed that a court had to
have sufficient familiarity with foreign laws to determine whether
the contempt order was civil or criminal, and believed that such
familiarity existed here.69 She argued that one had to look at the
substance of the contempt order and the purposes it sought to
achieve under foreign laws to ascertain any elements of penalty.70
In this case, She ruled that there was nothing penal in the contempt
order as the terms of the order were “designed to reinforce the civil
consent decree and to provide Pro Swing with restitution for Elta’s
violations” under the laws of the United States. 71 In conclusion,
contrasting with the reasoning of Judge Deschamps, the familiarity
with the laws of the United States actually guided Chief Justice
McLachlin to rule that the contempt order was civil in the eyes of
Canadian laws.72 By refraining from characterizing the contempt
order as penal, Chief Justice McLachlin also prevented Elta from
being subject to imprisonment, an unforeseen obligation to Elta.73
65. Id. para. 99.
66. Id.; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 7274 (Can.).
67. See Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 114.
68. Id.
69. Id. para. 108.
70. Id.
71. Id. para. 109.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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From this conclusion, Chief Justice McLachlin illustrated how
familiarity with the foreign laws could resolve the differences in
legal systems and arrive at a fair outcome by subjecting the
defendant to obligations intended by the foreign orders and
dismissing any unforeseen obligations.
Thirdly, responding to the issue of clarity and specificity of the
terms on the territorial scope of the orders, Chief Justice McLachlin
criticized the majority’s ruling for having too high a standard. 74
First, there were no explicit limits on the territory in which the
orders applied and nothing to suggest that such limits were ever
contemplated. 75 Second, Elta was operating an Ontario-based
website, therefore, any orders addressed to Elta could be
“regarded as pre-supposing extraterritorial application.” 76 And
third, since the terms of the orders required Elta to surrender
offending inventory, Chief Justice McLachlin argued that these
terms only made sense if the injunction was meant to apply outside
the borders of the United States.77 She criticized Justice Deschamps
for being contradictory when the majority judgement
acknowledged the extraterritoriality of the order requiring Elta to
surrender inventory but declined to infer the same
extraterritoriality in the orders enjoining Elta from purchasing and
selling the infringing goods. 78 Further, Chief Justice McLachlin
regarded the majority judgment as imposing “an artificially high
standard” by asking for “explicit terms making the settlement
agreement a worldwide undertaking” as Chief Justice McLachlin
argued that a plain reading of the orders already made its
extraterritoriality sufficiently clear.79 This reveals a difference in
approaches in interpretation as the majority judgment took a
literal approach while the dissenting judgment took a contextual
one.
Lastly, addressing the issues of public policy and personal
information protection rights of third parties, Chief Justice
McLachlin questioned whether the personal information collected
by private organizations, such as Elta in this case, was afforded
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. para. 117.
Id. para. 116.
Id.
Id.
Id. paras. 55-56, 117.
Id. para. 117.
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such quasi-constitutional protection. 80 Further, given that this
issue was not raised during the proceedings, Chief Justice
McLachlin regarded it inappropriate to rule on this issue in this
case.81 Finally, she argued that the orders could be severed if one
found that certain portions of the orders could not be enforced for
public policy reasons. 82 Hence, it was argued that the issue of
public policy should not be dispositive of the case.83
Since the dissenting judgment disagreed with the majority
judgment on all four grounds with valid arguments, it is evident
that the majority judgment failed to provide a convincing
argument that the application of the test was consistent with the
purpose of the test, which, as stated in the first paragraph of the
majority judgment, was to serve the society by providing prompt
reactions and effective remedies in modern-day transactions. The
conflicting interpretations of both the test and the facts might
eventually render the departure from the traditional rule nothing
but a bounced check.
Putting these conflicts between the majority and dissent aside,
the authors believe that the real problem of the majority judgment
comes from a lack of understanding of the benefits of enforcement
of foreign NMJs. Other than a few “slogans” on modern-day
commercial transactions and globalization in the first paragraph,
the majority failed to give detailed reasoning as to the motivation
behind the departure from the traditional rule and the purposes of
the new rule.84 For example, to what extent will the enforcement of
NMJs incentivize foreign merchants to trade with the Canadians?85
Elaboration on the economic benefits will be in line with the comity
argument. 86 Alternatively, will this rule encourage other
jurisdictions to follow suit and return the favor by enforcing
Canadian NMJs? This is in line with the reciprocity argument. 87
Finally, it may also be argued that the new rule will in any case save
the costs of both the private litigants and valuable public resources
80. Id. para. 120.
81. Id. para. 121.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 1.
85. Fredrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 36 AM. J. OF COMPAR. L. 4 (1988).
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. Id.
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of the Canadian judicial system from the evil of re-litigation. This is
the res judicata argument—that there should be an end of
litigation.88
Instead, the Supreme Court of Canada only cited three
materials that addressed none of the arguments above to support
the departure from the traditional rule.89 First, the court cited an
introductory comment by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada,
that “with the increasing mobility of the population and the
emergence of policies favoring the free flow of goods and services
throughout Canada, this gap [between monetary judgments and
NMJs] in the law has become highly inconvenient.”90 With all due
respect, this comment was originally directed toward an
interprovincial level, instead of an international one.91 Elevating an
interprovincial reasoning to an international level suggests that
issues of constitutional law, sovereignty of Canada as a whole
nation and her national interests were simply overlooked. In any
event, this quote spoke no more than what Justice Deschamps
wrote in the first paragraph of the majority judgment.92
Second, the Supreme Court cited a report by the British
Columbia Law Institute, in which the report cited the case of
Morguard Investments Ltd v. De Savoye to illustrate the existing
deficiencies in Canadian Private International Law: “It seems
anarchic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal
obligations arising in one province simply by moving to another
province.” 93 Once again, the report was directed toward
interprovincial enforcement. Further, while it is not in dispute that
evasion of obligations creates unfairness, 94 there are alternative
methods to avoid such unfairness. For example, as some English
scholars suggest, even under the traditional rule, the plaintiff can
apply for summary judgment with a new cause of action at the
88. Id. at 3.
89. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 81-84. The rationale for a change to the traditional
rule was provided by the dissenting judgment, while such rationale was approved by the
majority: “I have read the Chief Justice [McLachlin]’s reasons, and I agree that there is a
compelling rationale for a change in the common law requirement.” Id. para. 16.
90. Id. para. 81.
91. Id.
92. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 1.
93. Id. para. 82; Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1098
(Can.); BRITISH COLUMBIA LAW INSTITUTE, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONEY
JUDGMENTS FROM OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE 18 (1999).
94. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1102-03.
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place where the defendant resides, then on the basis of res judicata,
she can utilize the foreign NMJ to cut the proceedings short without
having to enforce the NMJ.95 It is unclear why enforcement is the
preferred method and both the report and the case of Morguard
fails to address this issue. Lastly, the Supreme Court cited the Civil
Code of Quebec to illustrate that Quebec did not distinguish
between money judgments and NMJs, so that the traditional rule
should be changed too.96 Quebec, as a province of Canada, affords
little weight in persuading all of Canada to follow Quebec’s
practices. Further, the fact that Quebec has made no distinction
between monetary judgments and NMJs provides almost no
reasoning as to why Canada should follow suit. Numerous
scholarly materials were cited in the majority judgment to guide
how the change to the traditional rule should be conducted. For
example, Professor Vaughan Black argued for an incremental and
cautious approach. However, the three materials above simply
provided no basis as to why the traditional rule should be altered
in the first place.97
Comity, reciprocity, and res judicata are the usual suspects in
enforcing foreign judgments in general, and one would expect the
court to address these reasonings beyond citing slogans on
interprovincial enforcement. On the flip side, it has long been said
that “hard cases make bad law.” Nonetheless, the court hardly even
cited one case that showed any injustice in the traditional rule. It is
thus safe to say that the Canadian case for changing the traditional
rule was based on some shaky grounds.
95 . However, if the non-money judgment of the foreign court is entitled to
recognition as res judicata, the fact that it cannot be enforced as a debt may be
of limited practical significance, for if proceedings which have to be brought on
the original cause of action can be cut short by showing the issues of substance
to be res judicata, with only the question of remedy left for the original decision
of the English court, the technical unenforceability of the foreign judgment is
merely a detail.
DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673 n.74; See ADRIAN BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS 494, ¶6.219(1st ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
96. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 83.
97 . Id. paras. 16-20; See Vaughan Black, Enforcement of Foreign Non-money
Judgments: Pro Swing v. Elta, 42 CAN. BUS. L.J. 81, 81-83 (2005); Jeff Berryman, Cross-Border
Enforcement of Mareva Injunctions in Canada, 30 ADVOC. Q. 413, 413 (2005); Adrian Briggs,
Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Rethinking the Law on Foreign Judgments 8 SING.
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2004); Jeffrey Talpis & Joy Goodman, A Comity of Errors, 14 L. TIMES 1, 7
(2003); Janet Walker, Beals v. Saldanha: Striking the Comity Balance Anew 5 CAN. INT’L
LAWYER 28, 28 (2002).
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On the other hand, the costs or risks of the new rule were
more obvious and predictable. The majority clearly foresaw some
problems with enforcing NMJs, such as higher administrative costs
and potential breach of public policies of Canada, though depth of
the problems was uncertain given that at the time of the judgment
there was no precedent on the enforcement of foreign NMJs in
common law jurisdictions. 98 This thus makes the majority taking
some very tentative steps, such as leaving open a wide backdoor
named discretion, to shut down the floodgates just in case. While
the majority might be commended for bravery to dive into the
murky water, one must still ask: What for?
In the end, Pro Swing will be best known as a case that failed
to quantify the benefits brought by the enforcement of foreign
NMJs and this is particularly so when there is no reciprocity from
other countries or jurisdictions. 99 Thus, from the position as a
sovereign, there is no guarantee that the national interests of
Canada would be furthered by the enforcement of foreign NMJs. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court should have examined the
commercial benefits to support the change to the traditional rule,
in other words, to examine how giving effect to the Ohio orders
would facilitate commercial transactions with the United States
and potentially the rest of the world. From the time of Huber,
facilitating commercial benefits is the driving force behind private
international law rules, but the Supreme Court seemed to have
overlooked such commercial interests.100 In this case, Elta avoided
accountability for unfair commercial practices by selling the
infringing golf clubs to the United States through its website in
Ontario, Canada.101 Such commercial practice was also regarded by
the Supreme Court to be unfair. 102 If the Supreme Court really
cared about modern day commercial transactions as said in the
first paragraph of the judgment, it should have no hesitation in
catching such unfair commercial practices to provide “prompt

98. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 40.
99 . The majority judgment refused enforcement of the contempt orders; and
immediately noted that the United States were unlikely to enforce such orders either.
There would be no reciprocal treatment from the United States even if Canada had
enforced the contempt orders. Id. para. 39.
100. Lorenzen, supra note 26, at 375.
101. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 67.
102. Id. para. 33.
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reactions and effective remedies.” 103 Instead, in considering
judicial economy and the integrity of the Canadian justice system,
the Supreme Court simply stated that Pro Swing could have
relitigated in Canada, which would defeat all the purposes of
enforcement and incur much higher costs to both the Canadian
judiciary and the private parties.104 Alternatively, as the Supreme
Court suggested, Pro Swing could have obtained evidence in
Ontario with letters of rogatory so as to allow the Ohio District
court to grant a monetary judgment and avoid duplication of
enforcement proceedings in Ohio and Ontario. 105 However, this
path fails to provide effective remedies to Pro Swing because the
damages would be minimal in amount when the settlement
agreement only concerned three golf clubs and two golf club
heads.106 It also goes without saying that prohibitory injunctions
are usually the only effective remedy that private parties seek in
infringement of intellectual property claims. 107 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court was making a reform for the sake of reform when
it was not clear that the measure would promote either the
national interests of Canada or the commercial interests of the
private parties, which arguably are also of national interest.
On the face of it, Pro Swing is a breakthrough in common law
jurisdictions; but our closer analysis reveals its inherently weak
foundation. At the time of the judgment, this did not appear to bode
well for the enforcement of foreign NMJs in Canada. One would
expect lower courts to struggle with such a broad and elusive
test. 108 In the following section, subsequent Canadian cases on
enforcement of foreign NMJs are examined to survey lower courts’
responses to the ruling in Pro Swing.

103. Id. para. 1.
104. Id. para. 40.
105. Id. para. 45.
106. Id. para. 46.
107. See Int’l Assoc. for the Protection of Intellectual Property [AIPPI], Resolution on
HCCH Judgments Project, Summary Report and Explanatory Paper, AIPPI General
Secretariat, Twenty-Second Session Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], No. 3 (May 2019), at 129.
108. See Stephen G. Pitel, Enforcement of Mon-monetary Judgments in Canada (and
Beyond), 3 J. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 241, 260 (2007).
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1. Subsequent Canadian Cases After Pro Swing 109
Table 1. Survey regarding Canadian cases on enforcement
of foreign NMJs
No.

Case Name

1. McClintock
(Conservator of)
v. McGriskin
2. The United
States of
America et al. v.
Yemec et al
3. Blizzard
Entertainment,
Inc v Simpson
4. Van Damme v.
Gelber
5. PT ATPK
Resources TBK
(Indonesia) v.
Diversified
Energy and
Resource Corp.
6. Bienstock v
Adenyo Inc.,
7. Oesterlund v.
Pursglove

Success?

Subject Matter

Origin of
Judgment

Yes

Constructive Trust and
Permanent Prohibitory
injunction

US

Yes

Permanent Prohibitory
Injunction

US

Yes

Permanent Prohibitory
Injunction

US

Yes

Specific Performance

US

Yes

Mandatory Injunction
Singapore
and Account for Profits

Yes

Constructive Trust

US

Yes

Freezing Order

US

109. See McClintock (Conservator of) v. McGriskin, [2010] O.N.S.C. 5511 (Can.); USA
et al. v. Yemec et al., [2010] O.A.C. 270 (Can.); Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. v Simpson,
[2012] O.N.S.C. 3807 (Can.); Van Damme v. Gelber, [2012] O.N.S.C. 5394 (Can.); PT ATPK
Resources TBK (Indonesia) v. Diversified Energy & Resource Corp., [2013] O.N.S.C. 4339
(Can.); Bienstock v. Adenyo Inc., [2014] O.N.S.C. (Can.); Oesterlund v. Pursglove, [2014]
O.N.S.C. 2313 (Can.); Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec v. S.K. Export Inc.,
[2015] N.B.Q.B 115 (Can.); Law Society of Upper Canada v. Kivisto, [2016] O.N.L.S.T.H. 181
(Can.); Specialist Hygiene Solutions Ltd. v. Marsh, [2017] Q.B.G. 379 (Can.); Dish Network
L.L.C. v. Shava IPTV Network LLC, [2018] O.N.S.C. 4076 (Can.); Zashko Entertainment Inc.
v. Touchgate Global Inc., [2018] O.N.S.C. 3245 (Can.); Dead End Survival LLC v. Marhasin,
[2019] O.N.S.C.. 2922 (Can.); Cao v. Chen, [2020] B.C.S.C. 804 (Can.); Pelletier (Agents of) v.
Pelletier, [2020] A.B.Q.B. 984 (Can.); Lanfer v. Eilers, [2021] B.C.C.A 1333 (Can.).
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8. Fédération des
producteurs
acéricoles du
Québec v. S.K.
Export Inc
9. Law Society of
Upper Canada v
Kivisto
10. Specialist
Hygiene
Solutions Ltd. v.
Marsh
11. Dish Network
L.L.C. v Shava
IPTV Network
LLC
12. Zashko
Entertainment
Inc. v. Touchgate
Global Inc.
13. Dead End
Survival LLC v
Marhasin
14.
Cao v Chen
15. Pelletier (Agents
of) v. Pelletier
16.
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No

Interim Prohibitory
Order

Yes

Disbarment Order

US

No

Party’s Undertakings in
a Consent Order

UK

Yes

Permanent Prohibitory
Injunction

US

Yes

Permanent Prohibitory
and Mandatory
Injunctions

US

Yes

Permanent Prohibitory
Injunction

US

Order dismissing
spousal support Partly enforced; Child custody
and support orders not enforced
Yes

Freezing Order

Canada

China
Cayman
Islands

Specific Performance
ordering transfer of
Lanfer v Eilers
Yes
Germany
property in British
Columbia
TOTAL: 16 cases (13 successful; 2 unsuccessful; 1 partially
successful)

Table 2. Statistics regarding Essential Components
considered in Canadian judgments
Essential
Number of Cases
Percentage of
Components Listed in
Considered
Cases
Pro Swing
(Total: 16 Cases)
Considered
Competent Jurisdiction
15
93.75%
Finality
9
56.25%
Not Penal in Nature
1
6.25%
Integrity of the Justice
8
50%
System
Familiarity with
7
43.75%
Foreign Law
Clarity and Specificity
9
56.25%
Extraterritoriality
4
25%
Public Policy
12
75%
Absence of Frauds
6
37.5%
Based on Table 1, it is clear that lower courts in Canada across
different states, most notably Ontario, have embraced enforcement
of foreign NMJs. Among the sixteen relevant cases, thirteen were
successful and only two cases were unsuccessful.110 Thus, one can
safely draw the inference from the overwhelming trend in Table 1
that Canadian courts in general take a liberal and progressive
approach toward the enforcement of foreign NMJs. However, given
the clumsy first step in Pro Swing, such an overwhelming trend in
the enforcement of foreign NMJs is puzzling.
This Article argues that the solutions to the puzzle in hand are
threefold. First, that Canadian courts do not require all the
“essential components,” including both factors raised in the
judgments of Pro Swing, when determining whether to exercise
discretion. From Table 2, it is clear that most of the Canadian cases
did consider the component of competent jurisdiction (93.75
percent). This is not surprising because it is a factor common to all
110. Although the small sample size of the Canadian cases in Table 1 constitutes in
no sense any comprehensive or conclusive understanding of the status quo of Canadian
courts’ enforcement of foreign NMJs.
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enforcement cases, irrespective to the nature of the foreign
judgments. For the other two basic requirements, finality and nonpenal nature, they share a lower percentage, especially the latter
(56.25 and 6.25 percent respectively). This is not especially
intriguing either because the subject matters of the cases might
have pre-empted such issues. For example, a civil and permanent
prohibitory injunction would not call for concerns of finality nor
their penal nature.111 However, the remaining figures are worthy
of further discussion. In Pro Swing, Judge Deschamps discussed
alternate methods of enforcement and the risks of wasting judicial
costs, but only 50 percent of the cases actually considered the
component of integrity of the justice system.112 Judge Deschamps
also warned about the danger of exposing Canadian litigants to
unforeseen obligations due to unfamiliarity with foreign laws, but
only 43.75 percent of cases managed to consider such dangers.113
Judge Deschamps also made an express statement that the United
States trademarks protection should not be able to reach into
Canadian soil simply because of the nature of an internet sale, but
the danger of over-extending foreign laws into a worldwide
undertaking only attracted 25 percent of the cases to consider.114
The heated disagreement between the majority and dissenting
judgments with regard to the standard for clarity and specificity
only prompted 56.25 percent of the cases to consider.115 Lastly, to
end on a relatively high note, 75 percent of the cases considered
the defense of public policy. Overall, despite the disagreement
between the majority and dissenting judgments with regard to all
four grounds considered in Pro Swing, judging by the statistics in
Table 2, the lower courts apparently have underestimated the
importance that the Supreme Court of Canada has attached to
those grounds. The loose application of Pro Swing in lower courts
has rendered the heated, yet valuable, debates between Judge
Deschamps and Chief Justice McLachlin in vain. Resulting from this,
the backdoor of discretion that the Supreme Court created to be
shut when needed is in fact seldom shut.
111. McClintock, [2010] O.N.S.C. 5511; Yemec, [2010] O.A.C. 270; Blizzard, [2012]
O.N.S.C. 3807; Dish Network, [2018] O.N.S.C. 4076; Zashko Entertainment, [2018] O.N.S.C.
3245.
112. Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, para. 40 [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 (Can.).
113. Id. para. 49.
114. Id. para. 62.
115. Id. paras. 57, 117.
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Second, Canadian courts do not create new factors to be
considered for discretion of non-enforcement. Third, while
considering the established factors, Canadian courts adopt a rather
liberal approach. These latter features are illustrated by the cases
below.
The first two cases contrast against Pro Swing on the issue of
extraterritoriality. In Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. v. Simpson, the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice was asked to enforce a California
non-monetary judgment that permanently enjoined Mr. Simpson
from infringing Blizzard’s copyrights. 116 The court found no
difficulty in enforcing the California judgment because the court
was satisfied “that the terms of the Order of the California Court
were clear and specific and that the considerations set forth in Pro
Swing were satisfied.”117 Sharing a similar subject matter with Pro
Swing, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice should have no
difficulty following the reasoning and analysis of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Pro Swing. Nevertheless, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice made no analysis on the issue of
“extraterritoriality,” on which Judge Deschamps in Pro Swing ruled
that extraterritorial application of US trademark protection should
not be allowed in default.118 It is important to bear in mind that the
issue of extraterritoriality did not cause much concern in Pro Swing
because the onus of the question was whether the consent decree
could be interpreted as Elta having agreed to such extraterritorial
application in the consent decree. 119 However, in the case of
Blizzard, the injunction was not contained in a consent decree by
which the Ontario court could have evaded the issue of
extraterritoriality. The Ontario court, if following Pro Swing
strictly, should have considered the issue of extraterritoriality and
potentially refused enforcement. The enforcement of the
injunction revealed the Ontario court’s loose reading of Pro Swing.
Further, the Ontario court made no mentioning as to what other
factors in Pro Swing were considered and how the facts of the case
passed the required threshold. Instead, in one broad stroke, the

116.
117.
118.
119.

Blizzard, [2012] O.N.S.C. 3807.
Id. para. 17.
Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 62.
Id. para. 56.
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Ontario court declared that considerations in Pro Swing were
satisfied.120
In Dead End Survival LLC v. Marhasin, once again, the plaintiff
asked the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to enforce a Georgia
non-monetary judgment that permanently enjoined the defendant
from infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks. 121 Once again, the
Ontario court enforced the judgment on the basis that the court
had jurisdiction and the defendant failed to establish any public
policy defense. 122 Similar to Blizzard Entertainment, this case
concerned
permanent
prohibitory
injunction
against
infringements of trademarks, and thus should have followed the
approach in Pro Swing. Instead, the Ontario court only considered
the public policy defense after establishing the jurisdiction of the
Georgia court being competent.123 Contrasting with Pro Swing, the
Ontario court considered neither the “clarity and specificity,” nor
the extraterritoriality issues in this case, notwithstanding that the
two issues played a pivotal role in the Pro Swing judgment of the
Supreme Court. This is not to mention that the Ontario court, once
again, made no mentioning as to what other factors in Pro Swing
were considered and how the facts of the case passed the required
threshold. This again shows how lower courts of Canada
selectively apply the test contained in Pro Swing.
The next case contrasts against Pro Swing on the difficulty of
administering the enforcement of NMJ and potential impacts on
third party right. In Pelletier (Agents of) v. Pelletier, the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench was asked to enforce a Cayman Freezing
Order in Canada in response to the bankruptcy proceedings in the
Cayman Islands. 124 The Alberta court acknowledged the list of
factors posed by Judge Deschamps in Pro Swing and considered
them one by one.125 Concluding that those factors were satisfied,
the Alberta court granted the application to enforce the Freezing
Order. Although the Alberta court prima facie followed Pro Swing
strictly, the analysis regarding the impacts on third party rights is
120. Blizzard, [2012] O.N.S.C. 3807, para. 17.
121. Dead End Survival LLC v. Marhasin, [2019] O.N.S.C. 2922 (Can.).
122. Id. para. 32.
123. Id. para. 26.
124. Pelletier (Agents of) v. Pelletier, [2020] A.B.Q.B. 984 (Can.).
125. Id. para. 53; Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612,
para. 30 (Can.).
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worthy of further discussion. In Pro Swing, Judge Deschamps ruled
that the potential infringement of the third parties’ rights of
personal information protection should suffice to bar enforcement
from a public policy perspective.126 In this case, the Alberta court
acknowledged that recognition of the Cayman Freezing Order
could indirectly affect Mrs. Pelletier’s son, Daniel, who was
attending a private Canadian boarding school funded by the assets
subject to the Freezing Order. 127 Yet it went on to rule that
“recognition of the Cayman Freezing Order would need to
accommodate spending that may be required by Mrs. Pelletier for
Daniel’s continued educational and medical needs.” 128 In other
words, not only did the Alberta court not refuse enforcement due
to the impacts on innocent third parties, the Alberta court took on
the responsibility to administer the Freezing Order to ensure that
there would be sufficient assets exempted from the enforcement of
the Freezing Order to support Daniel’s educational and medical
needs. This is to be further contrasted with Judge Deschamps’s
emphasis on the appropriateness of using local judicial resources
in Pro Swing. 129 Instead of going through a cost-and-benefit
analysis on the use of local judicial resources in this case, the
Alberta court simply signaled the need to accommodate Daniel’s
needs, treated this factor as satisfied, and went on to grant the
application. This is a good example of loose application of Pro
Swing.
Lastly, in Lanfer v. Eilers, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
ruled on whether a foreign judgment—a German judgment in this
case—that adjudicated title of interest to land could be enforced in
Canada by way of specific performance. 130 At first instance, the
chambers judge refused to enforce the German judgment on the
basis of a rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in Duke
v. Andler, which stated that Canadian courts would not enforce a
foreign judgment that adjudicated title of interest to land in a
foreign jurisdiction. 131 The decision in Duke v. Andler resonates
126. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 60.
127. Pelletier, [2020] A.B.Q.B. 984, para. 59.
128. Id.
129. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 48.
130. Lanfer v. Eilers, [2021] B.C.C.A 1333 (Can.).
131. Id. para. 2; Duke v. Andler, [1932] S.C.R. 734 (Can.). Duke involved a contract to
sell land in Victoria, British Columbia. The parties to the contract resided in California and
entered into the contract there. The vendors sued the purchasers for breach of contract
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with the long-standing British common law Mozambique rule,
which renders actions relating to title in foreign land, the right to
possession of foreign land, and trespass to foreign land nonjusticiable in common law jurisdictions. 132 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal reversed the Chambers Judge’s decision and ruled
that Pro Swing should be taken implicitly to have overruled Duke v.
Andler even though neither Pro Swing dealt with real property, nor
the reasoning of the Supreme Court came close to make that
overruling obvious.133 Further, the Court of Appeal ruled that as
long as the NMJs complied with the requirements of Pro Swing,
they would be entitled to recognition and enforcement in British
Columbia.134 Although the ruling indicates strict adherence to Pro
Swing, it lacks the vigilance that Judge Deschamps advocated in Pro
Swing where she stated that Canadian courts should always be
prepared to take into account new factors and new defenses when
the situation so demands.135 In this case, the subject matter was
land, the strongest form of immovable property and a cornerstone
of territorial sovereignty.136 Further, apart from the long-standing
British common law Mozambique rule, there was a precedent laid
down by Supreme Court of Canada that spoke volume as to the
special character of land in the law of recognition and enforcement.
These facts cry out for the need to consider new factors under the
Pro Swing test. Nonetheless, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
oversaw the need and adopted Pro Swing on face value.
and obtained a judgment for specific performance mandating the purchasers to re-convey
the land in British Columbia to the vendors from the California court. The Supreme Court
of Canada refused enforcement of the California judgment on the basis that the courts of a
foreign country have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title or the right to the
possession of any immovable not situated in such country. Id.
132. British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC (HL) 602
(appeal taken from Eng.).
133. Lanfer, [2021] B.C.C.A 1333, para. 74:
From this, I conclude that a foreign order for specific performance implicating
rights or interests in immovable property that complies with the requirements
of Pro Swing is capable of being recognized and enforced in British Columbia.
Duke no longer compels a conclusion to the contrary in light of subsequent
developments in private international law.
134. Id. para. 83.
135. Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, para. 31 (Can.):
The evolution of the law of enforcement does not require me, at this point, to
develop exhaustively the criteria a court should take into account. As cases come
up, appropriate distinctions can be drawn. For present purposes, it is sufficient
to underscore the need to incorporate the very flexibility that infuses equity.
136. British South Africa Co., [1893] AC (HL) 602.
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Overall, these subsequent cases after Pro Swing show that,
despite the clumsy first step, the Canadian courts encounter very
few issues with enforcing NMJs. The practices of the lower
Canadian courts have eliminated the concerns of the Canadian
Supreme Court and paved a broad highway for the enforcement of
foreign NMJs in Canada. This shows that the Supreme Court, in its
judgment in Pro Swing, might be over-concerned with issues that
do not arise in practice. On the other hand, these courts continued
to blindly take the assumption of the Supreme Court on the
presumed benefits of enforcing NMJs without asking any
questions. 137 Nevertheless, by proving that the enforcement will
come with little practical difficulties, one would expect the
experiment is a successful one for the whole world to see. However,
to date, only Jersey has elected to follow suit and to adopt the
enforcement of foreign NMJs.138 Thus, is there any reason stopping
other major common law jurisdictions from taking on the liberal
approach of Canada, given that the judicial costs might not be as
high as one might have thought? Examining the respective
approaches of the other two common law jurisdictions, England
and the United States, shall yield the answer.
III. ENGLAND, THE CONSERVATIVE
In Pro Swing, when Judge Deschamps first discussed the
traditional rule, she cited the authoritative English textbook, Dicey
and Morris on the Conflict of Laws as the basis for the traditional
rule instead of citing a Canadian authority.139 Afterwards, she cited
Canadian Conflict of Laws by Walker and Castel to confirm the
English position in Canada.140 From such a narrative, it shows that
the traditional rule is heavily influenced by that of England. Hence,
to analyze why other common law jurisdictions have not departed
from the traditional rule as Canada has done so, we must
investigate why the English jurisprudence, which at one point
aligned with that of Canada, does not break away from the
traditional rule like Canada did.
137. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 1.
138. See Brunei Investment Agency & Bandone Sdn. Bhd. v. Fidelis Nominees Ltd.
(2008) JRC 152 (Jersey).
139. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 10; DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 47475.
140. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, paras. 9-10; WALKER & CASTEL, supra note 15.
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Various English authoritative hornbooks acknowledge and
confirm the traditional rule as concisely put by Dicey, Morris &
Collins on the Conflict of Laws that, the foreign judgment has to be
for a fixed sum of money to be enforced in England. 141 These
English hornbooks cite the case of Sadler v. Robins unanimously as
the basis of the traditional rule.142 In Sadler v. Robins, the English
Hight Court (King’s Bench Division) was asked to enforce a decree
of the High Court of Chancery in the island of Jamaica. 143 The
decree ordered the defendants to pay a certain sum of money to
the plaintiffs on a specific date.144 Nevertheless, at the time of trial,
the defendant’s costs were waiting for taxation by officers in
Jamaica in the Jamaican proceedings. 145 Given that the defendant’s
costs would be deducted from the judgment sum, the judgment
sum would be subject to adjustments in the future. 146 Lord
Ellenborough refused to enforce the Jamaican judgment since the
sum due on the decree on the date of trial was “quite indefinite”
and could not be a foundation for a claim.147 In other words, under
Sadler v. Robins, one could only enforce a foreign judgment when
the judgment debts are certain in amount. Thus, the case actually
dealt with a monetary judgment which was rejected for lack of
finality. Although the case of Sadler v. Robins does not concern
enforcement of foreign NMJs, Lord Ellenborough’s emphasis on the
certainty of a fixed sum of money has been consistently construed
by English courts and scholars as laying down the long-standing
traditional rule against NMJ enforcement.
A number of English scholars have debated on whether
England should retain the traditional rule in face of modern-day
transactions. Leading English scholars argue that, if the foreign
NMJs are entitled to recognition, whether they will be enforced will
be of limited practical significance when the judgment creditor can
initiate a new cause of action in England, as this cause of action will
be in summary proceedings with the substantive merits of the
foreign judgment being recognized under the doctrine of res
141. See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 675; CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT,
supra note 3; BRIGGS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, supra note 95.
142. (1808) 1 Camp. 253 (Eng.).
143. Id. at 253.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 255-57.
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judicata, to establish liability. 148 They believe that this summary
proceeding will be short and cost-effective. 149 After establishing
liability through the recognized merits, the English courts will
grant remedies available under English law. This will avoid the
difficulty of giving effect to foreign remedy not known to local
court, a concern voiced in Pro Swing.150 It has been observed that
the local remedies are often the same as those ordered in the
foreign judgments. 151 Pursuant to this argument, these English
scholars are certain that a departure from the traditional rule is
neither imminent nor necessary.152
English scholars’ conservative view is also reflected in the
English courts. Our survey of English cases reveals a complete lack
of recent decisions relating to the enforcement of foreign NMJs.153
The only relevant case was Airbus Industrie G.I.E. v. Jaisukh Arjun
Bhai Patel and Others. 154 Dating back to 1996, the English High
Court (Queen’s Bench Division) was asked to enforce an Indian
anti-suit injunction restraining the defendants from claiming
damages against the plaintiffs in any courts other than those in
India.155 The English Court quickly refused the enforcement under
the traditional rule, citing Dicey and Morris.156 In particular, it is
important to note that Judge Colman’s observation on the complete
lack of decisions relating to enforcement of foreign NMJs.157 In his
words,
The explanation for the total absence of any such authority is
clearly that at common law a judgment for a monetary amount
148 . See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673 n.74; BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS supra note 95.
149 . See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673 n.74; BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, supra note 95.
150. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 51.
151 . See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673 n.74; BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, supra note 95.
152 . See DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673 n.74; BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, supra note 95.
153. The authors first looked at the cases cited in the English hornbooks. See DICEY,
MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31; CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 3; BRIGGS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS, supra note 95. The authors then searched for
subsequent cases citing those cases and tried to locate English judgments concerning
enforcement of foreign NMJs.
154. [1996] I.L.Pr. 465 (Eng.).
155. Id. at 8-10.
156. Id. at 26; DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS, supra note 31, at 673.
157. Airbus, [1996] I.L.Pr. 465 at 21.
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was analysed as giving rise to a judgment debt and, once that
legal obligation was created by a valid foreign judgment, an
action could be brought on that debt . . . However, an order of
a foreign court in personam did not become a judgment debt.
It gave rise to no independently enforceable obligation in the
eyes of the English courts.158

Hence, we may attribute the lack of decisions relating to
enforcement of foreign NMJs to the deeply rooted characterization
of judgment in English jurisprudence. As evidenced by Judge
Colman’s quote above, English courts simply equate foreign
judgments with foreign monetary judgment. Meanwhile, we found
no case in England discussing Pro Swing. This suggests that the
liberal movement in Canada has been largely ignored by English
courts. This might not be a surprise given the tendency of English
courts in staying with the traditional rules. For example, another
important though not directly relevant jurisdictional development
regarding “real and substantial” connection in Canada has also
received limited attention by the English judiciary. 159 Another
example was that the English House of Lords, in the case of Harding
v. Wealands, refused to apply a modern Australian case, John
Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v. Rogerson, which laid down Australia’s liberal
approach in regarding all questions about amounts of damages to
be substantive issues.160 Instead, the House of Lords resorted to a
nineteenth century case, Cope v. Doherty, for the proposition that
any statutory limits on the amounts of damages should be
regarded as procedural. 161 These examples signify the English
common law’s “formidable degree of inertia.”162
Finally, Hong Kong, a common law jurisdiction that closely
follows the English enforcement rules, did recently ask if the time
was ripe for a change to the traditional rule. In Jiang Xi An Fa Da
Wine Co Ltd v. Zhan King, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance
openly stated that today’s globalized world already went beyond
the imagination of the people living in the early nineteenth century

158. Id. at 474, ¶21.
159. Morguard, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, at 1098.
160. Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, 1 AC (HL) 1, 27 (appeal taken from Eng.);
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v. Rogerson (2000) 36 HCA 1 (Austl.).
161. Harding, [2006] UKHL 32, 46; Cope v. Doherty (1858) 4 K. & J. 367, 1127 (hL)
1131-32 (appeal taken from Eng.).
162. See Briggs, supra note 97, at 1.
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when Sadler v. Robins was ruled. 163 Given the developments in
Canada and Jersey after Pro Swing, a re-assessment of the
continuing applicability in Hong Kong of the two centuries old
common law prohibition on the unenforceability of foreign NMJs is
long overdue.164
In conclusion, the review of English authorities and literature,
contrasted with the recent query raised in Hong Kong, suggests
that the conservatism is so deeply rooted in the English
jurisprudence. Along with the lack of precedence is the devoid of
discussion on the benefits of changing the traditional rules. As
mentioned in our analysis of Canadian authorities above, the
Canadian courts never had any in-depth discussions there either.
Rather than diving into the elusive benefits of the liberal approach,
English courts prefer to refrain from judicial activism and adhere
to the traditional and time-tested rules. This Article argues that
such conservatism might be due to the interesting perception that
statutory development is rather important.165 Given that changes
in the enforcement rules would inevitably affect national interests
by extending the reach of foreign laws into English soil, it is in
English jurisprudence that legislature is often in a better position
to determine what is in the public interests.166 This is particularly
so when the benefits of enforcement of foreign NMJs are less
obvious or quantifiable as previously argued. The Parliament, as a
nation-wide public discussion forum on social and economic
163. [2019] H.K.C.F.I. 2411, HCMP 1574/2017 (H.K.).
164. Id. para. 84.
165. Briggs, Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Rethinking the Law on Foreign
Judgments, supra note 97, at 1; In Adams v. Cape Industries plc. [1990] 1 AC 16, 151-52
(Eng.), the Court of Appeals restricted itself to discerning the law on jurisdictional
competence, not changing it. In Owens Bank Ltd. V Bracco [1992] 2 AC (HL) 193,
202(appeal taken from Eng.) the House of Lords considered it too late for changing the
long-standing common law rule on fraud as a defense to recognition and enforcement.
166. James v. United Kingdom, (1986)8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, para. 46:
[T]he decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve
consideration of political, economic and social issues on which opinions within
a democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court, finding it natural
that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing
social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature’s
judgment as to what is ‘in the public interest’ unless that judgment be manifestly
without reasonable foundation.
Although the concept of margin of appreciation is usually employed in the context of
human rights in England, the case of James v United Kingdom illustrates English courts’
willingness to defer judgments of national interests to the legislature. Id.
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policies, is more equipped in both expertise and resources than the
judiciary to ascertain such less apparent nor quantifiable benefits
brought by the enforcement of foreign NMJs. Hence, in the eyes of
English courts, the legislature should be in the driving seat in
changing the traditional rule by statutory development. In other
words, it is expected that English courts would not change the
traditional rule unless and until the English Parliament sees
benefits to their national interests to do so and consequently
enacts a new statute or codifies an international instrument to the
same effect.
IV. UNITED STATES: THE MIXED BAG
A. Restatements
In the United States, the enforcement of foreign judgments is
governed by state law. The full faith and credit clause in the
constitution of the United States only applied to sister state
judgments and has no effect on foreign judgments.167 Further, even
though each state has its own laws on the enforcement of foreign
monetary judgments, state laws have been harmonized through
the adoption of two model statutes.168 There is, however, no model
statutes on the enforcement of foreign NMJ. Thus, many state
courts have to resort to the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of
Laws and the Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations for
guidance regarding the enforcement of foreign NMJs. 169 The
Restatements, however, do not provide a solid foundation in the
first place on the rationale in enforcing foreign judgments. On the
top of that, the state courts’ interpretation on the Restatements are
far from consistent. These lead to a very mixed practice of
enforcing NMJs in the United States.
Although the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws mainly
addresses inter-state enforcement, 170 it also comments on the
167. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1938); U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 1 cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit Clause”).
168. See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (NAT’L CONF.
COMM’R UNIF, STATE L. 2005).
169. See Stacie I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in US
Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 68 (2014).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 5.2, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (AM. L. INST.
1971).
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viability of state courts enforcing foreign NMJs. 171 The reporter
admits at the outset that the “[e]xisting authority does not warrant
the making of any definite statement” as to the enforcement of
international NMJs. However, he also notes that some state courts
have usually given effect to the foreign NMJs which meet the
requirements for judgments rendered in the sister states. 172 In
other words, sharing the same test for inter-state enforcement, a
foreign NMJ would be enforced so long as such enforcement is (1)
“necessary to effectuate the decree”; (2) “will not impose an undue
burden upon the American court”; and (3) “consistent with
fundamental principles of justice and of good morals.” 173 The
rationale behind such an approach is the adoption of the res
judicata argument—in other words, to serve the public interest by
putting an ultimate end on litigation. 174 Although Restatement
(Second) focuses on inter-state issues and the abovementioned
argument is in the form of a comment, this argument of enforcing
foreign NMJs has been endorsed and adopted by several states in
the United States, most notably Delaware and Florida.175
Turning to Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, it seems
to suggest the opposite. Unlike the English conservative position,
the general rule in the Restatement Third makes no express
prohibition against the enforcement of foreign NMJs.176 However,
the commentary section expressly states that foreign NMJs are “not
171. Id. §92 cmt. g.
172. Id; Roblin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. 200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 5.2, §92 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1971).
174. Id. §98 cmt. b.
175. For Florida, see Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996 (1990). For Delaware, see
Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Industries Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039 (1984). See also id. §102 cmt.
g (“A valid decree rendered in a foreign nation that orders or enjoins the doing of an act
will usually be recognized in the United States…That is to say, such a decree will usually be
given the same res judicata effect in the United States that it enjoys in the nation of its
rendition. So far as enforcement is concerned, it can safely be said that a valid foreign
nation decree that orders the payment of money will usually be enforced in the United
States.”). See also id. §102, Case Citations-by Jurisdiction, D.Del.; Fla.App.
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 (AM. L. INST. 1987):
(1) Except as provided in §482, final judgment of a court of a foreign state
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirming the
status of a person, or determining interests in property, is conclusive between
the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States; (2) A
judgment entitled to recognition under Subsection (1) may be enforced by any
party or its successors or assigns against any other party, its successors or
assigns, in accordance with the procedure for enforcement of judgments
applicable where enforcement is sought.
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generally entitled to enforcement, but may be entitled to
recognition.”177 Hence, on this basis, foreign NMJs are generally not
enforceable, just like the traditional rule in England.178 Arizona, for
example, is one of the states that has adopted this position.179
Interestingly, the narrative of the latest Restatement (Fourth)
of Foreign Relations published in 2018 suggests a rather different
position from that of its preceding version.180 In the commentary,
instead of speaking with a negative tone, the reporters
acknowledge that the state courts regularly recognize foreign NMJs
as a matter of comity. 181 Further, Restatement Fourth adds in a
new section titled Foreign Injunctions in which it is stated that “a
final and conclusive judgment of a court of a foreign state in an
action seeking an injunction or a comparable nonmonetary
remedy is entitled to recognition by courts in the United States.”182
Despite this section’s general acceptance of recognition of foreign
NMJs, state courts are given discretion not to enforce the foreign
NMJs and to decide whether to provide injunctive relief or other
types of remedies.183 Although it makes no definite statement as to
the enforcement of foreign NMJs, comparing with the narrative of
Restatement (Third), Restatement (Fourth) has certainly taken a
more liberal approach. Unfortunately, our survey reveals no case
on the enforcement of foreign NMJs that has cited Restatement
(Fourth). Hence, the effects of the more liberal approach suggested
in Restatement (Fourth) remain unclear.
A review of the Restatements reveals that the position on the
enforcement of foreign NMJs remains unsettled and they can point
state courts in either direction. This is consistent with our survey
of the United States cases. It is also a mixed bag: some of the states
are more liberal as in Restatement (Second), while some are more
conservative as in Restatement (Third). In the following section,
177. Id. §481 cmt. b.
178. Cf. Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Id. §481, Case
Citations – by Jurisdiction, Fla.App.
179. See Global Royalties, Ltd. V. Xcentric Ventures, LLC., No. 07-956-PHX-FJM 2007
WL 2949002 *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007).
180. The test for recognition and enforcement in Restatement Fourth is identical to
the one contained in Restatement Third. Compare RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 481, Rep. note 10 (AM. L. INST. 2018), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 481 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
181. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 cmt c (AM. L. INST. 2018).
182. Id. § 488 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
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United States cases on enforcement of foreign NMJs would be
examined to analyze the positions of the United States and the
different states on enforcement of foreign NMJs.
1. Survey on United States cases from a state perspective
Table 3. Survey regarding United States cases on Enforcement
of Non-Monetary Judgment184
Origin of
SuccessNo.
Case Name
Subject Matter
ful?
Judgment
Florida
Bullen v. Her
Majesty’s
1.
Government of the
United Kingdom

Yes

2. Cardenas v. Solis

Yes

3.

Cleary de Pacanins
v. Pacanins

Yes

4. Nahar v. Nahar

Yes

Intrinsic Values
Corp. v.
5.
Superintendencia
De Administracion

Yes

Receiving Orders

UK

Interim Freezing
Guatemala
Order
Interim Freezing
Venezuela
Order
Mandatory
Injunction on
Aruba
Transfer of Assets
Prohibitory
Injunction

Guatemala

184. Bullen v. Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom, 553 So. 2d 1344
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Cleary de Pacanins v. Pacanins, 650 So. 2d 1028, 1029-30 (Fla. 1995); Nahar v. Nahar, 656
So. 2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Intrinsic Values Corp. v. Superintendencia De
Administracion, 806 So. 2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Cermesoni v. Maneiro, 144 So. 3d
627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Amezcua v. Cortez, 314 So. 3d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021);
Roblin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. 200, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); In re: Letter Rogatory Issued By
the Second Part of the III Civil Regional Court of Jabaquara/Saude, Sao Paulo, Brazil, No.
01-MC-212, 2002 WL 257822 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 6, 2002); Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168 , 389
A.2d 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Industries Inc., 581 F. Supp.
1039 (D. Del. 1984); Siko Ventures Ltd. V. Argyll Equities, LLC, No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005
WL 2233205 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005); Global Royalties, Ltd. V. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No.
07-956-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 2949002 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007); Ravasizadeh v. Niakosari, 94
Mass. App. Ct. 123, 112 N.E.3d 807 (2018).
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7. Amezcua v. Cortez

Yes
Yes

Interim Freezing
Order
Interim
Prohibitory
Injunction
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Argentina
Mexico

New York
8. Roblin v. Long

No

Mandatory
Injunction

In re: Letter
Rogatory Issued By
the Second Part of
9. the III Civil Regional
Court of
Jabaquara/Saude,
Sao Paulo, Brazil

No

Freezing Order

Canada

Brazil

Others
10. Wolff v. Wolff
Pilkington Bros.
11. P.L.C. v. AFG
Industries Inc.

Yes

Alimony Provisions

UK

No

Interim Freezing
Order

UK

Mandatory
Injunction on
Hong Kong
Transfer of Shares
Global Royalties,
Mandatory and
13. Ltd. v. Xcentric
No
Prohibitory
Canada
Ventures, LLC
Injunctions
Islamic Marriage
Ravasizadeh v.
14.
Yes Contract on Marital
Iran
Niakosari
Assets
As enforcement of foreign judgments is a matter of state law,
it would be appropriate to analyze Table 3 from a state perspective.
Florida’s overwhelming track record in the past thirty years of
enforcing seven foreign NMJs provides convincing evidence that
Florida has fully embraced the enforcement of foreign NMJs.
With regard to New York, although enforcement of foreign
NMJs was unsuccessful in both cases, a closer analysis of the cases
reveals that New York courts did not rule out the enforcement of
12.

Siko Ventures Ltd. v.
Argyll Equities, LLC

Yes
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foreign NMJs, but simply rejected on other bases in these two cases.
In Roblin v. Long, the Supreme Court of New York decided whether
to enforce a Canadian judgment ordering the defendant to deliver
to the plaintiff “the patent of the lands and premises.”185 Although
the court refused to enforce the Canadian judgment, the New York
Supreme Court stated that judgments of another state or country
would be enforced provided that such enforcement would not
violate New York’s own laws or inflict injuries upon its citizens.186
In this case, the Supreme Court of New York expressly endorsed
the enforcement of the Canadian judgment in principle but failed
to enforce it because the lands and premises were situated in
Canada and thus out of the jurisdiction of New York. 187 In In re:
Letter Rogatory Issued By the Second Part of the III Civil Regional
Court of Jabaquara/Saude, Sao Paulo, Brazil, the New York District
Court decided whether to enforce a Brazilian letter of rogatory
mandating that a certain amount of money be frozen.188 The New
York District Court refused the enforcement on two bases: first,
that letters rogatory were an impermissible method for enforcing
a foreign NMJ in United States; second, the applicants failed to
demonstrate the risks that the assets would be dissipated and
unavailable to fulfil a judgment.189 It must also be noted that the
New York court refrained from ruling out the enforcement of
foreign NMJs in principle. Hence, despite the failure in the two
cases above, one cannot conclude that the New York state is against
the enforcement of foreign NMJs.
Regarding the other states above, the lack of authorities of
each state renders an articulation of a trend impossible. Some
states enforce the foreign NMJs solely based on the principle of
“comity.” 190 The principle of comity originated from the federal
case of Hilton v. Guyot, in which it is stated that reciprocity was a
pre-condition of such enforcement. 191 Nevertheless, it is widely
acknowledged that Hilton v. Guyot is not binding on state courts in
185. See Roblin, 60 How. Pr. at 201.
186. Id. at 205.
187. Id.
188. In re: Letter Rogatory, 2002 WL 257822.
189. Cf. Cleary de Pacanins, 650 So. 2d 1028 (enforcing a freezing order contained in
a letter rogatory issued by Venezuela.).
190. See Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md.App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978);
Ravasizadeh v. Niakosari, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 123, 112 N.E.3d 807 (2018).
191. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 10 (1895).
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the realm of enforcement and reciprocity should not be a precondition.192 The negative treatment of Hilton v. Guyot by the state
courts makes one wonder the kind of legal basis the principle of
comity is, especially when the Restatements have not been cited in
support. It keeps one wondering whether the principle of comity is
a valid legal basis; if so, what legal basis is it? What purpose does it
seek to achieve? What definitions, tests, or standards does the
principle of comity carry along? The concept of “comity” has no
contribution to rendering the position on the enforcement of
foreign NMJs more certain. In addition, the distinction between the
liberal approach in Restatement Second and the conservative
approach in Restatement Third has given state courts discretion to
choose which path they would like to take. 193 The split in
authorities suggest that the position of the United States on
enforcement of foreign NMJs falls within the grey area due to the
different approaches in the two Restatements and the ambiguous
understanding of comity.
B. Reciprocity
As stated in the preceding Section, the element of reciprocity
was ruled to be a pre-condition of enforcement of foreign
judgments in Hilton v. Guyot by the Supreme Court of the United
States.194 Nevertheless, various state courts decided not to follow
Hilton v. Guyot. 195 It has become almost a consensus among the
states that reciprocity is not a prerequisite for the enforcement of
foreign judgments.196 Thus, when considering whether to enforce
foreign judgment, including NMJs, state courts generally do not
consider the enforceability of US judgments in the relevant foreign
country. This is reflected in the way that state courts handle
192. See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Johnston v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381 (1926).
193. See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 07-956-PHX-FJM, 2007
WL 2949002 at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007) (showing that the state court had discretion in
deciding how to handle the concept of comity and refusing enforcement by citing
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations); Siko Ventures, Ltd. v. Argyll Equities, LLC, No.
SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL 2233205 at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005) (advocating for
granting enforcement by citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.)
194. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 210.
195. See Erie Railroad Co., 304 U.S. at 64; Johnston, 242 N.Y. at 381.
196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 cmt. D, Rep. n.1 (AM. L.
INST. 1987).
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enforcement of NMJs from Canada. As shown in Table 1, ten of the
thirteen NMJs enforced by Canadian courts since Pro Swing are
NMJs originated from the United States.197 Even though there is no
general requirement of reciprocity, a comity perspective suggests
that US state courts shall reciprocate and enforce NMJs from
Canada. This will forge a conducive pact on enforcement of NMJs
between Canada and the United States and will facilitate business
transactions between the two countries.
Further analysis, however, suggests otherwise. The only NMJ
related case post-Pro Swing is Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric
Ventures, LLC. 198 In this case, the Arizona state court refused to
enforce mandatory and prohibitory injunctions from Ontario
Superior Court of Justice on the basis of the conservative
Restatement (Third). 199 The judge made no mentioning of Pro
Swing or how the Canadian courts allowed enforcement of foreign
NMJs. 200 Further, Global Royalties Ltd is not alone, our research
reveals no subsequent cases citing Pro Swing nor enforcing
Canadian NMJs. Thus, not only was the judicial development in
Canada after Pro Swing largely ignored, there was also no
reciprocity between the courts of Canada and the United States on
enforcement of NMJs, whether as a legal condition or based on
comity.201
Does the practice of the state courts entail the end of the
reciprocity rule? United States scholars suggest the otherwise. In
2005, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) issued the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed
197 . See supra tbl.1; supra note 109 and accompanying text (highlighting NMJs
enforced by Canadian courts; Bienstock, [2014] O.N.S.C.; Blizzard Entertainment, [2012]
O.N.S.C. 3807; Dead End Survival, [2019] O.N.S.C. 2922; Dish Network, [2018] O.N.S.C. 4076;
Law Society of Upper Canada, [2016] O.N.L.S.T.H. 181; McClintock, [2010] O.N.S.C. 5511;
Oesterlund, [2014] O.N.S.C. 2313; Yemec, [2010] O.A.C. 270; Van Damme, [2012] O.N.S.C.
5394; Zashko Entertainment, [2018] O.N.S.C. 3245).
198. Global Royalties, 2007 WL 2949002. See Roblin, How. Pr. At 205 for an example
of US enforcement of a Canadian judgment prior to the Pro Swing decision. The New York
state court refused enforcement as the land in British Columbia, the subject matter of the
case, was outside the jurisdiction of the New York State Court. Id.
199 . See Global Royalties, 2007 WL 2949002, at *930, *932. The case was a
defamation claims and the injunctions granted by the Canadian court required the
defendant to remove any references to the plaintiff from the defendant’s website and
prohibited the defendant from posting any further defamatory messages. Id.
200. See id.
201 . See supra tbl.1; supra note 109 and accompanying text (highlighting
inconsistency in NMJ enforcement in post-Pro Swing jurisprudence).
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Federal Statute (“the ALI Proposal”) to invite the United States
Federal Government to impose uniform standards for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments throughout the United
States. 202 Although the ALI Proposal has not materialized into
legislation, it has provoked much academic discussion, especially
concerning the reciprocity rule. The reciprocity rule is contained in
Clause 7(a) of the Proposed Federal Statute, which states that “[a]
foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in
the United States if the court finds that comparable judgments of
courts in the United States would not be recognized or enforced in
the courts of the state of origin.”203 Accordingly, the ALI Proposal
would revive the reciprocity rule laid out in Hilton v. Guyot if
adopted and enacted.
The ALI argued that the rationale behind the reciprocity rule
was two-fold: (1) the need for uniformity across the United States;
and (2) to provide an incentive for other countries to enforce
United States judgments. 204 Regarding the first reason, the ALI
suggested that eight states adopted the 2005 Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act with a reciprocity provision;
two other states adopted the 2005 Act with a mandatory
reciprocity provision. Hence, to ensure that the enforcement rules
are uniform across different states, the ALI suggested that the
federal government to include a reciprocity rule.205 This argument
might not be the strongest considering that the rest of the states do
not have a reciprocity rule. Uniformity would be more easily
achieved if the ten states with reciprocity above abolish the rule.
Thus, the reason with more persuasiveness is the second one on
incentive and it is highly controversial among scholars. 206 ALI
argued that the reciprocity rule was intended to create an incentive
for foreign courts to recognize and enforce US judgments rendered,
thus protecting and promoting US national interests by lowering

202. RECOGNITION AND ENF’T OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL
STATUTE (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft 2005).
203. Id. § 7(a).
204. Id. §7 Rep. note 3.
205. Id.
206. See Robert L. McFarland, Federalism, Finality, and Foreign Judgments: Examining
the ALI judgments project’s proposed federal foreign judgments statute, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
63, 68, 94 (2010); Nathan S. Park, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Provisional
Orders in the United States: Toward a Practical Solution, 38 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L L. 999 (2017).

2021] ENFORCEMENT OF NON-MONETARY JUDGEMENTS

419

the threshold required to enforce US judgments in foreign
jurisdictions.207
Although the ALI Proposal was issued in 2005, the reciprocity
rule has continued to provoke further discussion ever since. On the
one hand, it is argued that in the interests of judicial economy and
justice, foreign NMJs should be enforceable in different
countries. 208 To achieve this outcome, and in the worldwide
context of decentralized legal systems, top-down directives are not
available and one must rely on horizontal negotiations. 209 To
facilitate such horizontal negotiations, reciprocity is the only
practical motivation for other countries to mutually allow
enforcement of foreign NMJs.210 On the other hand, the reciprocity
rule is objected to on numerous grounds.211 First, the reciprocity
rule sacrifices private rights because foreign NMJs might fail to be
enforced in the United States for lack of reciprocity and this would
bar private parties from obtaining the remedies that they are
entitled to under the foreign NMJs.212 Second, the rule would incur
further judicial costs. 213 Assuming that the foreign NMJ is not
enforced for lack of reciprocity, the plaintiff would need to initiate
a new cause of action, and it remains in doubt whether the lack of
reciprocity would also bar the foreign judgment from being
recognized on the basis of res judicata.214 If so, the new cause of
action would start from scratch and incur further costs.215 Third,
the rule would cause additional burden on the US legal system
207. “The purpose of the reciprocity provision in this Act is not to make it more
difficult to secure recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather to create
an incentive to foreign countries to commit to recognition and enforcement of judgments
rendered in the United States . . . “ RECOGNITION AND ENF’T OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 7 cmt. B (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft 2005); Id. § 7
Rep. note 1:
Thus, the rationale behind this section is that the interest of the United States
extends to having its judgments recognised and enforced in foreign courts, as
well as to recognising and enforcing judgments of foreign courts. The
expectation is that the incentives created by a reciprocity provision . . . would
lead generally to more liberal enforcement of judgments internationally.
208. Park, supra note 206, at 1018.
209. Id. at 1029.
210. Id.
211. McFarland, supra note 206.
212. Id. at 96.
213. Id. at 97.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 70-71.
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because further expert evidence is needed to determine whether
the foreign jurisdiction satisfies the reciprocity requirement. 216
Lastly, the rule gives rise to the issue of circularity.217 If another
jurisdiction has the same reciprocity rule, then a question arises as
to when and where the first foreign judgment will be enforced
between these two jurisdictions. 218 Since no prior foreign
judgment has been enforced to act as the basis for the reciprocity
rule to apply, the answer is that no foreign judgment will ever be
enforced between those two jurisdictions and this outcome goes
against the purpose of the reciprocity rule which is to facilitate
international enforcement of judgments. 219 Although the ALI
Proposal remains unenacted and scholars continue to diverge on
the issue of reciprocity, one must not overlook the importance of
reciprocity when advocating for a change in the enforcement
rules.220
V. A COMPARISON
The costs of enforcing foreign NMJs is not as high or as
complicated as what the Canadian Supreme Court has suggested in
Pro Swing.221 This is clearly reflected in the sixteen post-Pro Swing
Canadian cases. Along with the high rate of success in enforcing
foreign NMJs, no case failed because of such costs.222 From a cost
perspective, therefore, the difficulty of enforcing foreign NMJs is
not substantially higher than that of monetary judgments to merit
a difference between the enforcement of NMJs and monetary
judgments. Therefore, the two are only distinguished by their
216. Id. at 97.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 97-98.
220 . See Elias M. Medina, Recognizing the Need to Recognize: Proposed Foreign
Judgment Recognition Statute and Procedure for Enforcement in Louisiana, 80 Louisiana L.
Rev. 915 (2020); Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments Recognition
Law, 55 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT’L L. 277 (2017); John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgements
Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109 (2014); Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is it Broken and How Do We Fix It, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 150 (2013).
221. Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612 (Can.); see
discussion supra Part II.A.
222. See supra tbl.1; supra note 109 and accompanying text (citing Fédération des
producteurs acéricoles du Québec, [2015] N.B.Q.B 115; Specialist Hygiene Solutions, [2017]
Q.B.G. 379.).
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benefits. The advantages of enforcing NMJs are not obvious. Across
the three jurisdictions, no court has had any elaboration of the
benefits of enforcement of NMJs. In the rare cases in which courts
discussed this aspect, they resorted to “slogans” such as the
perceived necessity to facilitate international commerce. 223
Admittedly, it is difficult to argue against the slogan that the
enforcement of foreign NMJs will have a positive effect on world
trade and reduce re-litigation as stated by Judge Deschamps in Pro
Swing and the Hong Kong judge in Jiang Xi An Fa Da Wine Co Ltd.224
On the other hand, it is also difficult to quantify the advantages of
the enforcement of foreign NMJs as easily as monetary judgments.
A court can easily see the judgment debt in clear numbers for a
monetary judgment. As Sadler v. Robins has shown, when that
number is not certain, it gives a judge pause on enforcement.225
Whereas the benefits of enforcing an injunction will be much
harder to quantify. For sure, there will be some benefits to private
parties and the nation, but will it be high enough to justify a change
to the long-standing traditional rule against NMJ enforcement?
This is much less certain. Accordingly, it is more difficult to draw a
positive cost-and-benefit analysis on the enforcement of foreign
NMJs. It has then become a speculation of benefits, depending on
how positive a jurisdiction is toward the enforcement of NMJs. On
one end of the spectrum, we have Canada, while on the other,
England. Since individual state courts in the United States can form
their own views, it is not a surprise that their practices spread
across the two spectrums, with difficulty in finding a consensus.
However, once the green light has been given by the Canadian
Supreme Court, Canadian courts have no technical difficulties in
implementing the enforcement of NMJs.
In summary, the answer to the question why different
common law jurisdictions have not adopted Canada’s liberal
approach in enforcement of foreign NMJs seems to lie in the lack of
motivation to change the status quo. This Article argues that the
motivation could come from reciprocity as advocated by the ALI.
As we can see from Canada’s experience after Pro Swing, the
generous lifting of the traditional rule has received no
corresponding enforcement from other jurisdictions, particularly
223. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52, para. 1; Jian Xi An Fa Da Wine, [2019] H.K.C.F.I. 2411.
224. Pro Swing, 2006 SCC 52; Jian Xi An Fa Da Wine, [2019] H.K.C.F.I. 2411.
225. Campbell, supra note 142.
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the United States, which, is Canada’s largest trading partner. 226
Instead, the United States simply benefitted from Canada’s liberal
approach without affording reciprocal treatment of Canadian
judgments. 227 This situation could serve as a caution to other
jurisdictions that are considering initiating the enforcement of
foreign NMJs in the hope of other jurisdictions returning the favor.
Having enjoyed the benefits provided by Canada, the United States
ironically has one fewer incentive to reciprocate. Understanding
that the friendly gesture has been taken advantage of, Canadian
scholar, Professor Vaughan Black, advocated for a balance between
the United States and Canada. Echoing the reciprocity argument,
he advocated forming a bilateral private international law treaty
between the United States and Canada.228 In the authors’ opinion,
Professor Black, a key academic figure cited by the majority of the
Canadian Supreme Court in Pro Swing, most likely took this view
as the unlevel playing field in NMJ enforcement between the courts
of United States and Canada later became increasingly apparent.
Reciprocity as a legal condition on NMJ enforcement might just be
the motivation that common law jurisdictions need to change the
rule. The Hague Judgments Convention might just provide the
timely motivation.
VI. HAGUE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION: THE PIGGYBACK RIDE
A. Negotiation History on the Enforcement of NMJs
Recognizing that international transactions have become
increasingly important, the Hague Judgments Convention seeks to
reduce the legal obstacles in international trades by implementing
an efficient and predictable legal framework for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments across different jurisdictions. 229

226. See GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, CANADA’S STATE OF TRADE 2020 16.
227. See supra tbl.1; supra note 109 (citing USA et al. v. Yemec et al., [2010] O.A.C.
270 (Can.)).
228. Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and Credit Clause, 18 S.W. J.
INT’L L. 595, 602 (2011) (“Still, given the extent of the Canada-U.S. commercial and cultural
relationship, a relationship facilitated by two important trade conventions, formal
institutional cooperation in the private law field is miniscule.”).
229 . Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Overview of the
Judgments
Project,
at
3,
https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-andstudies/details4/?pid=6843&dtid=61 [https://perma.cc/8QVL-SAAA]; Convention of 2
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The Hague Judgments Convention traces back to 1992 when the
Hague Conference on Private International Law initially proposed
to develop a broad convention on international jurisdiction and
enforcement rules.230 It did not bear fruit in terms of recognition
and enforcement rules until 2012. 231 In 2012, the Hague
Conference decided to re-launch the project and worked on
recognition and enforcement rules. 232 In July 2019, the Hague
Judgments Convention was concluded. 233 Currently, the Hague
Judgments Convention is not yet in force, with only four countries
having signed the Convention—Israel, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Costa
Rica.234 The European Union is now considering signing after they
invited feedbacks on the Convention in early 2020.235 More states
are likely to become signatories in the future should the European
Union decide to sign the Convention.
With regard to the enforcement of NMJs, Clause 1(b) of the
Convention provides that NMJs are within the scope of the
Convention:
“[J]udgment” means any decision on the merits given by a
court, whatever that decision may be called, including a decree
or order, and a determination of costs or expenses of the
proceedings by the court (including an officer of the court),
provided that the determination relates to a decision on the
merits which may be recognized or enforced under this

July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or
Commercial Matters (not yet in force).
230. Id. at 1.
231 . The initial proposal was later scaled down to focus on choice of court
agreements, and later led to the conclusion of the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of
Court Agreements, which only attracted few countries to ratify; Id. at 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234 . Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Status Table,
Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil
and
Commercial
Matters,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=137
[https://perma.cc/C6TT-XHR8].
235. Directorate-General Justice and Consumers, The Possible EU Accession to the
2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
or Commercial Matters: Summary Report – Public Consultation, European Commission
(November 2020); Commission Proposal on the Accession by the European Union to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial
Matters, at 42, 58, COM (2021) 388 final (July 16, 2021).
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Convention. An interim measure of protection is not a
judgment.236

The enforcement of NMJs in general did not cause much
controversy during the negotiation of the Hague Judgments
Convention. As early as 2000, a large majority of the Special
Commission tasked with preparing the Preliminary Draft
Convention rejected a proposal that a distinction be drawn
between the enforcement of monetary judgments and NMJs.237 The
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference acknowledged that
most of the common law jurisdictions adhere to the traditional rule
and prohibit enforcement of foreign NMJs. 238 However, during
preliminary discussions within the Commonwealth Secretariat, it
became clear that some common law jurisdictions might be willing
to consider covering at least some NMJs on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.239 The basis of such willingness
rested on the finding that the non-enforcement of NMJs equate to
a failure in recognizing the fact that judgments often require more
than simple payment of a sum of money.240 This is especially the
case in commercial contexts. 241 Common law jurisdictions’
willingness to enforce NMJs did not come as a surprise because
they were also given the discretion not to sign the Hague
Judgments Convention, or wait for a later date to sign and ratify.
The Permanent Bureau also found that non-monetary rewards of
arbitration proceedings were enforceable in those common law
jurisdictions. 242 Therefore, the Permanent Bureau argued that
common law jurisdictions should encounter little difficulty in the
enforcement of foreign NMJs. 243 Further, the Permanent Bureau
236. See HCCH, Overview of the Judgments Project, supra note 229, art. 3(1)(b).
237 . Hague Conference on Private International law [HCCH], Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters adopted
by the Special Commission and Report by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, Prel, Doc, No 11, at
art. 23 (a), n. 147 (Aug. 2000).
238. Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Annotated Checklist of
Issues to be Discussed by the Working Group on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
(prepared by the Permanent Bureau), at 19, ¶ 74 (Jan. 2013).
239. Id. at 20, ¶ 76.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242 . Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Explanatory Note
Providing Background on the Proposed Draft Text and Identifying Outstanding Issues (drawn
up by the Permanent Bureau), Prel. Doc. No 2 (April 2016) at 12, ¶ 52.
243. Id. at 12, ¶ 53.
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discovered that, none of the international instruments studied
were limited to money judgments. 244 As a result, the Hague
Conference found sufficient support to cover the enforcement of
NMJs in the Hague Judgments Convention.
However, the Hague Conference did struggle to come to a
consensus in two respects, both relating to the enforcement of
NMJs: first, enforcement of provisional and protective measures;
second, inclusion of intellectual property. 245 With regard to
provisional and protective measures, they were originally included
in the 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention.246 Nevertheless, due to
concerns of finality and compatibility with different legal systems
of the enforcing jurisdictions, the Hague Conference eventually
decided to exclude provisional and protective measures from the
definition of “judgment” in Article 3(1)(b) of the Convention. 247
With regard to intellectual property, delegates of different
jurisdictions could not agree as to whether intellectual property
rights should fall within the scope of the Hague Judgments
Convention, nor whether there should be enforcement of NMJs
originating from intellectual property rights.248 Since intellectual
property rights were expected to require much more lengthy
deliberation and special treatments of the Hague Judgments
Convention, the Hague Conference resolved to exclude intellectual
property rights from the Convention and left it for another date.249
Although the exclusion of provisional and protective measures,
and intellectual property rights would undoubtedly curtail the
scope of enforceable NMJs, it is no doubt a positive step toward
global enforcement of NMJs. The Hague Judgments Convention is
the first international instrument advocating for the enforcement
of NMJs and displacing the distinction between monetary and non-

244. There are four regional instruments are: the Montevideo Convention, Las Leñas
Protocol, Riyadh Arab Agreement and Lugano Convention; Id. at 18, ¶ 75.
245. HCCH, Explanatory Note, supra note 242; and AIPPI, Resolution on HCCH
Judgments Project, supra note 107.
246. HCCH, Explanatory Note, supra note 242.
247. See Hague Conference on Private International Law [HCCH], Comments on the
Preliminary Draft Convention, adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999, and
on the Explanatory Report by Peter Nygh and Fauso Pocar, Prel. Doc. No 14 of April 2011
(discussing the disapproving views of Korea and Japan); HCCH, Explanatory Note, supra
note 242, at 12, ¶ 52.
248. AIPPI, Resolution on HCCH Judgments Project, supra note 107.
249. Hague Convention, supra note 5, at 2.
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monetary judgments. For advocates of NMJ enforcement, it is
hoped to be the first of many steps to come.
B. Is the Time Ripe to Ride on Piggyback?
The enforcement of NMJs is just one of the many changes
proposed and advocated in the Hague Judgments Convention. It is
not expected to be the key motivation for countries to join the
Hague Judgments Convention. Yet, given the other perceived
benefits of joining the Convention, most notably the reciprocal
enforcement of monetary judgment, NMJ enforcement may
indirectly be adopted across the signatories as a “tie-in.” Plenty of
jurisdictions across the world, though not generally common law
jurisdictions, to date impose difficult hurdles to enforce monetary
judgment.250 This Article does not speculate on whether countries
will join the Convention. However, it is safe to say that, for the
countries which decide to join the Convention, the Convention
provides a piggyback ride for NMJs enforcement. Thus, whether
the time is ripe for common law jurisdictions to change the
traditional rule and allow enforcement of foreign NMJs ultimately
depends on whether countries, especially those major economic
powers, see it ripe and beneficial for their national interests to join
the Hague Judgments Convention.
In the end, enforcement of foreign NMJs is good on paper, yet
its benefits are difficult to be quantified in practice. Without a clear
picture of the benefits that the enforcement of foreign NMJs will
bring in practice, it is difficult to motivate the common law
jurisdictions to make a wholesale change. If the issue of
enforcement of foreign NMJs is read on its own, it is hard to see the
time will ever be ripe. If Canada changed the traditional rule in the
hope of encouraging foreign countries to enforce Canadian NMJs, it
must be said that the result was not successful. 251 The Hague
Judgments Convention provides a window of opportunity because
the Convention includes changes other than the enforcement of
NMJs and countries might join the Convention due to other benefits.
Further, countries would have a much clearer picture of the
250. For example, Indonesia does not enforce foreign judgment at all. See John Coyle,
Rethinking Judgment Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1151-53 (2014).
251. Though the Canadian court has never formally acknowledged this. See supra
tbl.3.
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benefits yielded by the Convention because they can observe what
the other signatories are before joining. If the signatories are major
economic powers, for example the European Union, other
countries are more incentivized to join the Convention.
Consequently, enforcement of foreign NMJs will ride the piggyback
of the Convention.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article asks if the time is ripe for common law
jurisdictions to alter the traditional rule and allow the enforcement
of foreign NMJs, and if so, how the change will take place. By first
reviewing Pro Swing, it set the framework of the costs-and-benefits
considerations in the enforcement of foreign NMJs. Survey of
subsequent Canadian cases then show that despite the sluggish
start in Pro Swing, the Supreme Court of Canada exaggerated the
costs in enforcing foreign NMJs. Meanwhile, with the benefits of
adopting such a liberal approach has never been made clear, it begs
the question as to why other common law jurisdictions should
follow suit.
These same costs-and-benefits considerations are reflected
too in England and the United States. England is the most
conservative among the three. Both the academic literature and
the complete lack of cases on enforcement of foreign NMJs suggest
that the traditional rule is so deep-rooted in English jurisprudence
that English courts choose to circumvent the bar against NMJ
enforcement by the doctrine of res judicata rather than changing it.
Again, courts in England have never discussed the benefits of
enforcing foreign NMJs, possibly under the impression that the
Parliament is in a better position to assess such benefits. On the
other hand, United States is a mixed bag. Since enforcement of
foreign judgments is a matter of state law, different states take
different approaches to NMJs. Depending on the view of the courts
on costs and benefits of NMJs, they can draw on different sources
of authorities to establish their respective NMJ enforcement rule,
especially when the Restatements also differ on this issue. The US
states' approaches towards NMJs largely remain unclear. With the
exception Florida, which possesses an overwhelming track record
of enforcing foreign NMJs, most states lack instructive caselaw or
express statements of their stances.
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A comparison of these three common law jurisdictions reveals
that there is no compelling argument supporting their legal
positions in terms of the enforcement of foreign NMJs. It is
currently a matter of preference instead of obligations. Therefore,
the common law jurisdictions need an incentive to change the
traditional rule, as suggested by the ALI Proposal. The Hague
Judgments Convention in 2019 appears to be just the motivation
that is needed. It proposes and advocates different changes in
recognition and enforcement rules, one of which is the inclusion of
enforcement of NMJs. Should more countries be enticed to join the
Convention for their national interests, the rule for the
enforcement of foreign NMJs will ride on the piggyback of the
Convention and become more common across countries and
jurisdictions. Although only four countries have signed up for the
Hague Judgments Convention for now, European Union’s recent
interest in joining indicates that the time may soon be ripe.

